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Price  inflation  is  the  rise  in  the  money  price  level  of goods  and
services  in  general  or  in  the  aggregate.  Stated  differently,  it  is  the
decline  in  the  real  value  or the  real  purchasing  power  of a sum of
money.
If  there  was  no  inflation  (positive  or  negative),  we  would  not
expect  to  see  the  money  price  of every  commodity remain  exactly
constant  through  time.  We  would  not  be  surprised  to  observe  in-
creases  in  the  prices  of  some  commodities,  decreases  in  the  prices
of  other  commodities,  and  little  change  in  the  price  of  still  other
commodities.
Similarly,  during a period of inflation, we should not expect to see
the prices  of all  commodities  rising at the same  rate.  We  should not
be  surprised  to observe  the prices  of some  commodities  rising more
rapidly  than  the  prices  of other  commodities-and,  during mild  in-
flations,  we  should  not  be  surprised  to observe  the money  price  of
some commodities actually falling.
The Measurement of Inflation
Inflation  is  measured  with  price  indices,  and  there  are  a  large
number  of  price  indices  available  for  the  U.S.  economy.  These
various  price  indices differ from one another  according to the com-
modities  they  cover  and  also  according  to the  weights  (or  impor-
tance)  which  is  attached  to  the  covered  commodities.  Three  of
the  most  commonly  used  price  indices  of  the  U.S.  economy  are
the Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI);  the Wholesale Price Index, which is
now  officially  referred  to  as  the  Producer  Price  Index  (PPI);  and
the Gross National Product Price Index (GNPPI).
The  Consumer Price Index.  The  CPI  measures  the  relative  dollar
cost  at different  points  in time of a certain  market  basket  of goods
and  services  which  is thought to be representative  of the purchasing
patterns  of urban  consumers.  It covers  everything  urban  consumers
buy-food,  clothing,  shelter,  transportation,  medical  care,  recrea-
tion, etc.
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index  in  1967  is  100  by definition.  The  value of the index in June
1979  was  216.3,  which  indicates  that  it  took  116.3  percent  more
dollars  to  buy  essentially  the  same  market  basket  of  consumer
commodities  in  June  of  1979  than  it  did  on  the  average  in 1967.
From  June  1971  to  February  1973,  the  CPI  rose  at  an  average
rate of 3.9 percent per year; from February  1973 to November 1974,
it rose at  10.6 percent  per  year;  from  November  1974 to December
1977,  it  rose  at  6.3  percent  per year;  and  from December  1977 to
June  1979, it rose at an average rate of 10.6 percent per year.
The  Producer Price Index.  The  PPI  measures  the  relative  dollar
cost  at  different  points  in  time  of  a  market  basket  of  goods-no
services  are  covered by this index-which are sold in bulk amounts or
in large  quantities.  Important  items  covered by this index are wheat,
corn,  soybeans,  crude  oil,  sheet steel, copper, rubber, etc. This index
does  cover  some  finished  or  final  goods,  but it is  heavily  weighted
toward raw materials and intermediate  goods.
Examination  of  the  PPI  during the  1971-1979  period  indicates
that it has more  than doubled-from  about 110 to  230  (1967=100)
-for  all  commodities.  The  same  observation  holds  when  the  PPI
for  Industrial  Commodities  and  for  Farm  Products  are  examined
separately,  though  their rates of change have varied during individual
and groups of years during the 1970s.
I  have  also  looked  at  the  PPI  for  much  longer  periods-back  to
1800  for All  Commodities;  back to 1913 for the separate indices for
Industrial  Commodities  and for Farm  Products.  They  indicate  quite
clearly  that  periods  of  price-level  stability  have  been  historically
rare  in  the  United  States.  In  fact,  the longest period  of high  price-
level  stability which  the  United  States  has thus far experienced  was
the 13-year period which ran from 1952 to 1965.
The  Gross National  Product  Price Index. The Gross  National Prod-
uct is  a measure  of the dollar value of the total  output of the econ-
omy,  and the GNPPI  is the price  index  for the Gross National Prod-
uct.  It measures  the relative  dollar  cost of a market  basket of goods
and services which includes everything produced in the U.S. economy.
The  GNPPI  is  obviously  much  more  comprehensive  than  either
the  CPI  or  the  PPI.  The  GNPPI  for  the  period  from  early  1971
through  the  second  quarter  of 1979  (1972=100)  shows  an increase
from  95  to  164.  But  its  rate  of increase  varied  within that period,
as we  will see later.
As useful  as the  price  indices  are for measuring inflation, they are
often used in such a way as to give the public a misleading impression
of the cause  of inflation.  This  is  partly  because  the price  indices  by
their  very  nature  are  built  from  weighted  averages  of  individual
prices,  and it is usually possible to account for a specific increase in a
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of  commodities  or  even  increases  in  the  prices  of  particular  com-
modities.  For example,  we are  all familiar  with statements issued by
the  federal  government  (and  dutifully  reported  by  the  national
news media) of the following type:
Last  month,  the  Consumer  Price  Index rose  1.2  percent.  Most
of  this  rise-0.8  percent-was  the  result  of  increases  in retail
food  prices.  Beef prices  were  the leading offender  in that they
rose  5.0  percent,  but  the  prices  of  fresh  fruits and  vegetables
were  also  up  2.0  percent.  The  increases  in the retail prices  of
beef  and  fresh  fruits  and vegetables  reflect in  large  part recent
increases  in farm  prices for these  same  commodities.  However,
it appears  that the mark-up  on  beef by the meat packing indus-
try  and  also  the  mark-up  by  both wholesalers  and  retailers  of
fresh fruits and vegetables rose last month.
Aside  from  the  increase  in  food  prices,  other  important  con-
tributors  to inflation last month were increases in new automo-
bile prices and home construction  costs.
The  clear  implication  of  a  statement  such  as  this  is  that  "last
month's inflation"  was the result of villainous actions on the part of
certain  groups  in the economy-in this particular case, certain groups
of farmers,  food processers  and distributors,  automobile manufactur-
ers, and home builders.
We  get  a statement  like this each month. In fact, we get two state-
ments:  one  when  the  CPI  is  released  and  one  when  the  PPI  is  re-
leased.  Of  course,  the  inflation villains  of any particular  month  are
usually  not the same  as the villains  of the  previous month  or of the
following  month,  and  they  are  not  always  groups  of people.  The
blame  for  inflation  is  shifted  from  month  to  month  among  such
diverse  groups  as  oil  producers,  farmers,  labor  unions,  manufac-
turers,  merchants,  etc.,  and  among  such  events  as early frosts,  cold
winters, droughts, insect infestations, transportation breakdowns, etc.
Such  explanations  of  specific,  short-run  changes  in the  price in-
dices  are  misleading.  They  give  the public  the false  impression that
there  is  no  underlying  or  fundamental  force  responsible  for  infla-
tion;  that  inflation  is  merely  the result of an unfortunate  sequence
of increases  in the prices of particular commodities and that these in
turn  are  due  to  the  socially  irresponsible  acts  of  groups  of  sellers
of  goods  and services  (including  the sellers  of labor services)  and/or
acts of nature.
The Cause of Inflation
Inflation  is  fundamentally  a  monetary  phenomenon.  It is  caused
by  too  rapid  a  rate  of  increase  in  the  nation's  money  stock.  A
25significant  rate of inflation over an appreciable  period to time cannot
occur unless  it is  accompanied  by  a  sufficiently rapid increase  in the
money  stock.  Similarly,  for  all  practical  purposes,  no  set of public
policy  actions  intended  to  reduce  the rate  of inflation  can  succeed
in  the  long run unless  that set  of policy actions includes a reduction
in the rate of money stock growth.
Money  is  like  any  other  commodity.  When  its  supply  increases
rapidly  (more  rapidly  than its demand),  its value  tends to  fall.  That
is what  inflation  is  all about-the  decline  in the real value  or the real
purchasing power of money.
Table  1 shows  some  data on the rate  of inflation and  the rate  of
money  stock  growth  in  the  United  States  since  the  early  1950s.
During  1952-65,  the  average  rate  of  increase  in  the  money  stock
was  low and  so  was the average rate of inflation  (as measured by the
CPI,  PPI,  or  GNPPI).  During  1966-70,  the  average  rate  of  money
stock  growth  was  higher  and  so  was  the  rate  of  inflation.  During
1971-76,  the  average  rate  of  money  stock  growth  was  even  higher
and  so  was  the rate of inflation. Finally,  during 1977-78,  the average
rate  of  money  stock  growth  was  still  higher  and  so  was  the average
rate  of  inflation  as  measured  by  the CPI and  the GNPPI  (although
the  average  rate  of increase in  the PPI was  about  1.0  percent lower
during  1977-78 than during 1971-76).
Table  1:  U.S. Inflation,  1952-78
1952-65  1966-70  1971-76  1977-78
Average Annual
Increase in CPI  1.3%  4.5%  6.6%  7.9%
Average Annual
Increase in PPI  0.7%  2.7%  8.9%  7.8%
Average  Annual
Increase  in GNPPI  1.9%  4.4%  6.6%  7.2%
Average  Annual
Increase  in Money
Stock  2.2%  5.1%  6.1%  7.3%
In  Table  1,  the money stock is measured according to the Mldefi-
nition.  M1  consists  of  the  sum  of  currency  and  commercial  bank
checking  (or  demand)  deposits  owned  by the nonbank  public.  The
"nonbank  public"  consists  of  individuals,  ordinary  business  firms
(excluding  commercial  banks),  and  state  and  local  governments.
In  other words,  the "nonbank  public"  is  all  persons and institutions
other than the U.S.  federal  government,  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks,
and commercial  banks.
Other  definitions  of the  money stock  could have  been  employed
in constructing  a table  like  Table  1. However,  the use of any  of the
other  common  definitions  of  the  money  stock  would  not  have
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tion in which  rate of money  stock growth, by any definition,  is rela-
tively  low  are  periods in  which the rate of inflation is relatively low.
Periods  of relatively  rapid  money  stock  growth  are  periods  of rela-
tively rapid inflation.
Table  2  shows  the relationship  between  the rate of money stock
growth  and  the rate of inflation  in the United Kingdom and Sweden
during  three  recent  time  periods.  These  two  countries  were  singled
out  because  they  have  experimented  considerably  (and  unsuccess-
fully)  with  wage  and price controls as anti-inflation tools in the post-
World  War  II period.  Note  the  strong correlation  between  the rate
of money  stock growth  and the rate  of inflation in the United King-
dom.  The  correlation  is not nearly as strong in Sweden, but then few
people  would  argue  that wage  and  price  controls have  no short-run
effect upon the rate of increase  in the price indices.
Table  2:  Inflation in the United Kingdom and Sweden
Average  Annual  Average Annual
Increase  in Money Stock  Increase in CPI
U.K.
1953-63  2.5%  2.9%
1963-70  4.7%  5.1%
1970-76  15.1%  16.6%
Sweden
1953-63  6.8%  3.5%
1963-70  5.6%  5.1%
1970-76  13.5%  10.1%
Table  3  shows  rates of inflation  and rates of money stock growth
in  16  Latin American  countries  during the  19-year  period  1950-69.
The correlation between the rate of money stock growth and the rate
of inflation among these countries is very  strong.
During  this  century,  there  have  been  seven  instances  of hyperin-
flation  for which  we have  good data.  A hyperinflation  is a very high
rate  of inflation:  in  excess  of 50  percent  per month.  Table  4  shows
what happened to the price level and the money stock during each of
these  hyperinflations.  For  example,  between  January  of  1921  and
August  of 1922,  Austria  experienced  a hyperinflation.  At the end of
this period,  the price level in Austria was nearly 70 times higher than
it had been  at the beginning  of the period  (19  months earlier).  Dur-
ing the hyperinflation,  the Austrian  money  stock expanded rapidly:
at  the  end  of  the  hyperinflation,  it  was  more  than 19  times larger
than  it  had  been  at  the  beginning.  For another  example,  Germany
experienced  its famous  hyperinflation  between  August of  1922 and
November  of  1923.  During  this  period,  the  German  money  stock





































was  expanded  7.3  billion-fold and the  German  price  level  rose  10.2
billion-fold.
During  each  of  these  instances  of  hyperinflation,  the  price  level
rose  considerably  more  than  did the money  stock.  The explanation
is  straightforward.  As  the rate of inflation  rose, people spent money
more  and  more  rapidly  in  order  to  avoid  holding  it, since  its value
was  declining  commensurate  with  the  rate  of  inflation.  The  effect
Table 4: Seven Hyperinflations
Austria  (Jan. 1921  to Aug.  1922)
Money  Increase
Price Increase
Germany (Aug.  1922 to Nov.  1923)
Money  Increase
Price Increase
Greece (Nov.  1943 to Nov.  1944)
Money  Increase
Price  Increase
Hungary  I (Mar.  1923 to Feb.  1924)
Money  Increase
Price Increase
Hungary II (Aug.  1945  to July 1946)
Money  Increase
Price Increase
Poland  (Jan. 1923 to Jan.  1924)
Money  Increase
Price  Increase
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1.19 x  1025 times
3.81  x 1027  times
395  times
699 times
33.8 thousand  times



















.of  this  action  on  the part of people to  protect themselves  from  in-
flation was to cause the price level to rise all the more.
The Federal Rate of Money Stock Growth
Contrary  to popular  belief,  for the past  30 years  or so,  there has
been  no  firm  connection  between  government  deficits  and  money
stock  growth  in  the  United  States.  When  the  federal  government
runs a fiscal deficit, it does not finance its deficits by printing money.
It  finances  its  deficits  by selling government bonds to  people, busi-
ness  firms,  commercial  banks,  and  state  and  local governments.  The
sale  of federal  government  bonds to these  groups does not cause the
U.S. money stock to rise.
The  size  (and  rate  of  growth)  of the U.S.  money  stock  is deter-
mined  by  the  people  who  run  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  The
Federal  Reserve  System  is  a  quasi-public  institution  which  is  by
law,  for  the  most  part,  independent  of the President  of the United
States  and  also  of the Congress.  However,  it should  be pointed  out
that the people  who run the  Federal Reserve  are  generally reluctant
to  cross  swords  with the President;  they tend to set monetary  poli-
cies  which  are  consistent  with  the  wishes  of  the  administration  in
power.
The  Federal  Reserve  authorities  can make  the  U.S. money  stock
grow  rapidly or grow  slowly  (or even  decline)  regardless  of whether
the  federal  government  is  running  a  large  or  a  small  fiscal  deficit
(or  even  a  fiscal  surplus).  For some  examples:  in  1969, the federal
government  had  a  fiscal  surplus  of  $8.5 billion,  and  the M1  money
stock grew  3.3 percent;  in  1972, the federal government had a fiscal
deficit  of  $17.3  billion,  and the Ml  money  stock grew  a whopping
9.2 percent; in 1975, the federal government's fiscal deficit amounted
to  $70.2  billion,  and yet the M1  money stock grew only 4.1 percent;
in  1978,  the  federal  fiscal  deficit  was  $29.9  billion,  and  the  M1
money stock grew 6.6 percent.
Reducing the Rate of Inflation
In  order to bring down the rate of inflation  in the United States,
the  rate  of  growth  of  the  U.S.  money  stock  must be permanently
reduced.  Balancing  the  federal  budget,  imposing  wage  and  price
guidelines  or controls, achieving  energy independence,  etc., will have
no  lasting effect  upon the rate  of inflation  if the money  stock  con-
tinues  to  grow  at  6.0  or  7.0  percent  per year (or greater)  as it has
during recent years.
However,  reducing  the  rate  of inflation  in  the  United  States  is
not  necessarily  a  simple  and  painless  matter  of  cutting  the rate of
money  stock growth.  A  decline  in the rate of money  stock growth
will  cause  a  decline  in the rate of growth  of total spending  for the
output of the economy. This is likely to have only a small effect upon
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likely to be upon the real output of the economy,  causing it to grow
more  slowly  or possibly  to decline.  Assuming that the rate of money
stock growth remains  permanently reduced, with the passage of time
the rate  of inflation will  slowly  drop  off,  and  the real output of the
economy  will return to its long-run  growth path.
How  long it will take for the rate of inflation to fully respond to a
reduction  in the rate of money  stock growth is  a matter of some de-
bate  among  economists.  The  longer  it takes,  the  longer the real out-
put  of  the  economy  will  be  adversely  affected  (i.e.,  depressed).
The  reason  that  the  rate  of  inflation  is  not very  sensitive  in  the
short  run  to  reductions  in  the  rate  of  money  stock growth  (or re-
ductions  in the rate of growth of total spending)  is that the behavior
of  most  individual  wages  and  prices  in the United  States  is  heavily
influenced  by  expectations  of  inflation.  For example,  when  people
generally  expect  the  rate  of inflation  to  be  high  in the near future,
wage  increases  in  both  unionized  and  nonunionized  sectors  tend to
be  set  to  reflect  the  anticipated  rise  in  the  general  price  level.  [In
early  1975,  when  the  economy was  quite  depressed  and the  unem-
ployment rate was about 9.0 percent,  wage  (including fringe benefits)
increases  still  averaged  7.4  percent  per  year.]  Since labor  costs are
about  75  percent  of  the  total  factor  costs  of producing  goods  and
services  in  the United  States, large  wage  increases  result in price  in-
creases which are nearly as large.
Wage  and  price  guidelines  or  controls  may  be  useful  devices  to
help  the  economy  adjust  to  a  decrease  in the rate of money  stock
growth.  They  may  make  inflation  fall  faster  and  real output fall less
than  would  otherwise  be the case.  However,  wage and price controls
are not a substitute for a reduction in the rate of money stock growth.
A  permanent reduction  in  the rate  of money  stock growth is the es-
sential  ingredient  in  any  anti-inflation  program  if the program  is  to
prove  successful in the long run.
Controlling the U.S.  Money  Stock
Some  additional  comments  are  appropriate  relative  to  my earlier
argument  that the  size  and rate  of growth  of the  U.S. money  stock
is determined  through  the  Federal Reserve  System. This statement  is
sometimes  challenged;  therefore,  I  offer  the  following  supporting
evidence  for my position.
The conventional  wisdom  of the economics  profession  is that the
Federal  Reserve  authorities  are  capable  of  controlling  the  size  of
the  U.S.  money  stock  with  some  degree  of  accuracy  or  precision.
For  evidence  to  substantiate  this contention,  take  a look at any  of
the  popular  economics  principles  texts.  Each  contains  one  or more
chapters  describing  how the Federal  Reserve  authorities  are  capable
of affecting the size of the U.S. money stock.
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were  capable  of  affecting  the  size  of the  U.S.  money  stock,  they
would  not describe how this is done in their texts.  If the great major-
ity of academic  economists  did not believe  that the Federal Reserve
authorities  were  capable  of  affecting  the  size  of the  U.S.  money
stock,  these books  would not be  (in  some  cases, through as many as
ten  editions)  the  best  selling  economics  principles  texts  on  the
market.
Look  at  any  of  the  popular  texts  for  use  in  the  undergraduate
money  and  banking  course.  Each  contains  several  chapters  in which
the  impact  of  Federal  Reserve  policy  actions  upon  the  size  of the
U.S.  money  stock  is  described  and  discussed  in considerable  detail.
If the  Federal  Reserve authorities  cannot  in fact control the size  of
the  U.S. money  stock, then virtually all the money and banking texts
and  economic  principles  texts  which  have  been  written  in  the  last
40 years are in error.
The  Federal  Reserve  authorities  believe that they  can control  the
size  of  the  U.S.  money  stock.  For  evidence  to  back  up  this state-
ment,  look at one  or two  recent  issues of the Federal Reserve Bulle-
tin, the official  publication of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve  System.  Most  issues  of  the  Bulletin  contain  a  "Record  of
Policy  Actions  of the  Federal Open  Market  Committee"  pertaining
to  a date approximately  three months earlier.
The  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  consists  of  the
seven  governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  plus  five  Federal
Reserve  Bank  presidents.  At the meetings  of the  FOMC,  the stance
of  U.S.  monetary  policy  for  the  near  future  is  decided,  and  it  is
described  at least  in  part  in terms  of the rate of growth  of various
measures  of the  U.S.  money  stock.  For example, the August  1979
issue  of  the Bulletin reports  what took  place  during the meeting  of
the  FOMC  on  May  22,  1979.  The directive  adopted by the  FOMC
at this meeting contains the following statement:
".  . .it  is  the policy  of the Federal Reserve  Open Market  Com-
mittee  to foster monetary  and  financial  conditions  that will re-
sist inflationary  pressures while encouraging moderate economic
expansion  and contributing  to a sustainable  pattern  of interna-
tional  transactions.  At  its  meeting  on  February  6,  1979,  the
Committee  agreed  that these  objectives  would  be furthered  by
growth  of M1,  M2,  and  M3  from  the  fourth  quarter  of  1978
to  the  fourth  quarter  of  1979  within  the ranges  of  11/2  to  41/2
percent,  5  to  8  percent,  and  6  to  9 percent  respectively.  The
associated  range  for  bank  credit  is  71/2  to  101/2  percent.  These
ranges  will  be reconsidered  in July  or at any time as conditions
warrant.
In  the  short  run,  the  Committee  seeks  to  achieve  bank
reserve  and  money  market  conditions  which  are  broadly
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cited  above,  while giving due regard to the program for support-
ing  the  foreign  exchange  value  of the dollar and to developing
conditions  in  domestic  financial  markets.  Early  in the  period
before  the  next  regular  meeting,  System  open  market  opera-
tions are  to  be directed  at maintaining  the weekly  average  fed-
eral funds rate at about the current  level.  Subsequently,  opera-
tions shall  be directed at maintaining the weekly average federal
funds  rate within the range of 91/2  to  101/2  percent.  In deciding
on the specific  objective  for the federal funds rate, the Manager
shall  be  guided  mainly  by  the  relationship  between  the latest
estimates  of  annual  rates of growth  in the May-June  period  of
M1  and  M2  and  the following  ranges  of tolerance:  0  to 5  per-
cent for M1 and 4 to 81/2 percent for M2. If, with approximately
equal  weight given  to Ml  and  M2,  their rates  of growth appear
to  be  close  to  or  beyond  the  upper  or lower  limits of the  in-
dicated  ranges,  the  objective for the funds rate is to be raised  or
lowered in an  orderly fashion within its range.
If the  rates  of growth  in  the aggregates  appear  to be above
the upper limit or below  the lower limit of the indicated ranges
at a time when the objective for the funds rate has already been
moved  to  the  corresponding  limit  of  its  range,  the  Manager
will  promptly  notify  the  Chairman,  who  will  then  decide
whether  the situation  calls  for supplementary  instructions from
the Committee."
Admittedly,  the  ranges  of  growth  in  M1,  M2,  and  M3  which the
Federal  Reserve  authorities  called for in this directive are quite wide,
and the actual  growth rates  achieved  for M1,  M2,  and  M3  are  often
outside  of the  targeted  range.  However,  would  the  Federal  Reserve
authorities  give  directives  in terms  of the rate of growth  of the U.S.
money  stock  if they  did not  believe that these  directives  would  re-
sult  in  actions  which  affect  the  rate  of  growth  of the  U.S.  money
stock?
The  Congress  of  the  United  States  believes  that the Federal  Re-
serve  authorities  can  control  the size  of the U.S.  money  stock.  For
evidence  to  support  this  contention,  I  refer  you to House  Concur-
rent  Resolution  133,  which  was  approved  by  the U.S.  Congress  on
March  24,  1975.  This  resolution,  among other things, requested that
the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System consult with
the  Congress  at semi-annual hearings  before the Committee on Bank-
ing,  Housing,  and  Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Banking,  Currency,  and  Housing  of  the  House  of  Representatives.
These  consultations  or  hearings,  the  resolution  stated,  should  con-
cern:
. ..  the  Board  of  Governors'  and  the  Federal  Open  Market
Committee's  objectives  and  plans  with  respect  to the ranges  of
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upcoming twelve months."
Now  I  ask you:  If the Congress  does not believe that  the Federal
Reserve  Authorities  can  control  the  size  of  the  U.S.  money  stock
(the monetary  aggregates),  why would the Congress ask the Board of
Governors to consult  with it periodically concerning the Federal Re-
serve  authorities'  plans  or  money  stock  growth  over  the  next  12
months?
Money  Stock Growth vs. Monopoly  Power
Arguments  are often  heard that it is monopoly power rather than
money  stock  growth  which  is  the cause  of modern  day inflation.  I
will  elaborate  further  on  my  earlier  contention  that  money  stock
growth causes inflation.
One  of  the  oldest  and  most durable  theoretical  propositions  in
economics  is  that  an  increase  (a  decrease)  in  a  country's  money
stock  will  cause  an  expansion  (a  contraction)  in  its  aggregate
nominal  income  (or  its  aggregate  income  measured  in  terms  of
money).  Although  this proposition  is often  associated with quantity
theory  of  money  and with monetarism,  it is consistent  with  all but
the  most  elementary  versions  of Keynesian  macroeconomic  theory
and with  all modem macroeconomic  theories which have any degree
of  acceptance  within  the  profession.  While  macroeconomists  may
disagree  with  one another  on how theoretically  stable  or consistent
is the response of nominal aggregate income to changes in the money
stock,  few  if  any  would  argue  that nominal national  income  would
not be affected by a change in the money stock.
Of  course,  an  increase  in nominal  aggregate  income  can  take the
form  of an  increase  in  the  aggregate  price  level,  an  increase  in real
income,  or some combination of the two. However,  the rate at which
the real  income  (or output)  of an economy  can grow in the long run
is  limited  by  real  rather  than monetary  forces.  Real long-term  eco-
nomic growth  is limited by the rate of growth  of capital, labor, and
available  natural  resources,  plus  the  rate  of  technological  progress.
Few  if  any  economists  would  argue  that  the  real  forces  in  the
second-half  of the  20th  century  are  such  as to allow the aggregate
real  output  (income)  of  the  U.S.  economy  to  grow  by as much  as
4.0  percent  per  year  in  the  long  run.  If this is true, any  long-term
money  stock  increase  in  excess  of  4.0  percent  per  year times  the
elasticity  of the demand  for money  with respect to real income will
result  in  significant  long-run  U.S.  price  inflation.  My  own  research
and  the  research  of  other monetary  economists  indicates  that  the
elasticity  of the  demand for M1  money  with respect to real income
is  about  0.5.  This,  together with the long-run  growth  prospects  for
the  U.S.  economy,  suggests  that  the M1  money  stock should  grow
by  no  more  than  2.0  percent  per  year  on  the  average  if  the  U.S.
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Thus,  the  argument  that  money  stock  growth  has  something  to
do  with the rate  of inflation  is  firmly grounded in economic theory.
And  the  argument  that  price  inflation is  due to  rapid money  stock
growth  is supported  by  an  enormous amount  of empirical  evidence.
Indeed,  I  am  unaware  of a  single  historical  example  of  a  country
experiencing  a significant amount of price inflation over several years
without  a simultaneous  growth in the per capita money stock in that
country of comparable  magnitude.
By  way  of contrast, the argument that price inflation is due to the
presence  of  elements  of monopoly  power  in  the  economy  has  no
basis in  economic theory.  It is,  of course,  easy  to demonstrate  that
a monopolized  industry will  charge  a higher price and will produce a
smaller  output,  other  things  remaining  the  same,  than  a  perfectly
competitive  industry.  However,  price  inflation  is  not  high  prices;
inflation  is  a  rising  price  level.  Once  a  monopoly  has  found  its
profit-maximizing  price,  it  will  not  raise  its  price  further  unless
the demand for its product increases or its costs rise.
Further,  there  is  little,  if  any,  empirical  evidence  to support the
hypothesis that inflation  is  due  to the  presence  of sellers  with mon-
opoly  power  in  the  economy.  For  example,  between  1865  and
1890,  the  U.S. economy  became  significantly  monopolized  as  great
trusts  were  organized  in  the  oil,  steel,  tobacco,  meat  packing,  farm
machinery,  etc.,  industries.  Based  on  these  facts,  a  believer  in  the
monopoly  explanation  for inflation  should  expect  the rate of infla-
tion during  1865-90  to be  high and rising. Yet, the price level fell by
about  50  percent  between  1865  and  1890.  The  explanation  is
straight-forward:  There  was  relatively  little  growth  in  the  U.S.
money  stock  between  1865  and  1890,  at  least  compared  with the
growth  in the  real output of the economy  between  these two dates.
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